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After 1935, the Mediterranean had a major role in the policy of the the European great 
powers. There were three important naval powers in the area with significant interests and 
influences. In the 1930s Great Britain, France and Italy were dominant countries, they 
determined the political development in the Mediterranean. 
Although England did not border on the Inland Sea, her fleet surpassed the strength of 
the two Latin powers, both in quantity and quality. The Mediterranean had a significant 
part in the British naval strategy from the 18th century. London occupied Gibraltar in 1704 
and Malta in 1800, so these important bases assured the English naval mastery in the 
Mediterranean. In the 19lh century Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882) came under the rule of 
Britain, and after the First World War the Empire occupied Palestine and other parts of the 
Middle East (Iraq, Transjordan).1 After 1704 England stationed a permanent fleet with 
modem warships in the Inland Sea that was the famous Mediterranean Fleet, which 
became the symbol of the British military power in the area until 1967? 
Leaders of the English policy and the Admitralty insisted on the maintenance of the 
Mediterranean Fleet keeping three factors in view. The first was the significant trade with 
the Mediterranean countries and the defence of the British shipping. England had 
prosperous commercial relations with Spain, Italy Turkey, and Egypt from the 15-16b 
centuries. 
The Mediterranean Fleet was an excellent instrument to secure the traditional 
continental balance of power, too. During the 18-19"' centuries the employment of the 
naval forces, stationed in Malta, supported the South European policy of Great Britain on 
many occasions. In the Napoleonic Wars and later in the Eastern crises the use of the fleet 
had the result that neither France nor Russia could gain the ascendancy over the 
Mediterranean. 
In the end, the Suez Canal (opened in 1869) gave a third role for the Mediterranean 
Fleet.3 This new waterway made the Gibraltar-Malta-Suez axis the most important 
strategical route of the British Empire soon. The canal connected the European waters 
1 The British also ruled the Island of Menorca (1708-1782) and the Ionian Islands (1814-1863) for a 
shorter period. Richmond, Herbert: Statesmen and Sea Power. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946. pp. 
92-154 and p. 213. 
2 Famous Commander-in-Chiefs, Mediterranean Fleet: Sir John Jervis, Lord Horatio Nelson, Lord 
Collingwood, Sir John A. Fisher, David Beatty, Sir A B. Cunningham. More information about the 
British Mediterranean Fleet: Pack, S. W. C.: Sea Power in the Mediterranean. A study of the 
struggle for sea power in the Mediterranean from the seventeenth century to the present day. 
London, Arthur Baker Limited, 1971. 
3 Balázs Réti: Szuez és a brit tengeri stratégia 1918-1940. (Suez and the British Naval Strategy 
1918-1939) In: Dél-Európa vonzásában. Pécs, University Press, 2000. pp. 249-255. 
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with the Indian Ocean. In the 18-19ш centuries, owing to the British conquest, this ocean 
became a "Mare Nostrum"of England. India, regarded as the jewel of the British Crown, 
gave a real importance of the waterway since it made the communication with the Vice-
Royalty more effective. The route across the Mediterranean was the main arteria of the 
Empire, because not only India did become faster accessible, but the Far East, Australia, 
New Zealand and East Africa were easier to reach as well. 
Naval forces and relations in the Mediterranean 
In the period between the two world wars the strongest naval power of the area was 
definitely Great Britain.4 Her fleet firmly guarded the entrances of the sea, Gibraltar on 
the west and Suez on the east. Malta was situated in the central basin, and this island was 
the main port of the Mediterranean Fleet. In the Eastern Mediterranean Egypt, Cyprus and 
Palestine made Britain's strategical position really strong.5 
France was the sècond most powerful naval state in the area, her main colonies were in 
the western basin. The French ruled Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The triangle among 
Bizerta, Oran, and the greatest French naval base, Toulon was the fundamental ground of 
the Mediterranean strategy of Paris. The presence of France was strenghtened by Syria 
and Lebanon in the Levant.6 
Italy had a favourable strategical position because of her central geographical location. 
Besides the Apennine Peninsula, she possessed the important islands of the sea, Sicily and 
Sardinia. Her colonial territories in Lybia, Dodecanese and East Africa were not valuable 
economically, but their strategical and political importance made them significant.7 Italy 
had the weakest economy among the Mediterranean great powers, she owned only 
417.000 tons of warship displacement while France had 502.000 tons and Britain had 
1.265.000 tons'of it.8 Local naval force relations were much more favourable to Rome 
since Italy could concentrate her whole fleet in the Mediterranean while the French left a 
4 About the relations of the great navies between the two world wars: Command Papers 2036 Treaty 
between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America for Limitation of 
Naval Armaments. Treaty Series No.5. London, H. M. S. O., 1924.; Dénes Halmosy: Nemzetközi 
szerződések, 1918-1945. (International Agreements, 1918-1945). Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1983. pp. 194-207.; Hall, Christopher: Britain, America and 
Arms Control, 1921-1937. London, Macmillan, 1987.; Roskill, Stephen: Naval Policy Between the 
Wars. The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929. London, Collins, 1968.; Edwards, 
Kenneth: Uneasy Oceans. London, Rich and Cowan, 1939. 
5 The best descriptions of the contemporary naval power relations in the Mediterranean: Slocombe, 
George: The Dangerous Sea. The Mediterranean and its Future. London, Hutchinson, 1936., 
Edwards, Kenneth: The Grey Diplomatists. London, Rich and Cowan, 1938. 
6 Edwards 1939: op.cit., pp. 164-168 and 219-231. 
7 Sándor Kürthy: Az olasz gyarmatpolitika új útjai. (New Ways of the Italian Colonial Policy) In: 
Külügyi Szemle, 1935. .ХП. évfolyam, 3. szám.; Etele Papp: Az európai államok afrikai 
gyarmatpolitikája. (Colonial Policy of the European Countries) In: Külügyi Szemle, 1935. ХП. 
évfolyam, 4. szám. 
8 László Erdős: A Brit Államszövetség fegyveres hatalma. (The Military Power of the British 
Commonwealth) In: Magyar Szemle, 1937. augusztus, XXX. kötet. 
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significant number of naval units on the Atlantic coast and the British had lots of 
responsibilities all over the world. 
England did not take the Italian threat into cosideration until 1935. There was quite a 
good relationship between Mussolini and Great Britain. The Italians did not want a 
conflict with the powerful Royal Navy, as they knew that Italy had a long undefended 
coastline. A possible war against England would have resulted with a total economic 
collapse in the country, which depended on sea trade. Thus Mussolini acknowledged the 
priority of Britain, however, he did not want to accept the lead of France in the 
Mediterranean. Italy wanted to reach a naval equality with Paris, even through great 
economic sacrifices. This was the ground of the naval armament race between the two 
Latin countries. The Italians were not able to reach the total equality, but in certain 
warship classes they obtained advantages. On 1st February 1935 the naval strength of the 
three great powers were the following (units under construction are in brackets):9 
Warship class British Empire France Italy 
Battleships, 
battlecruisers 15 (-) 
9(2) 4 (2 ) 
Aircaft Carriers, Sea 
Plane Carriers 8(1) 2 (-) H - ) 
Cruisers 51 (13) 20(6) 24(6) 
Destroyers 161 (26) 70 (21) 94(8) 
Submarines 51(9) 96 (15) 59 (8) 
The British naval strategical plans worked out in the 1920s reckoned with the safe use 
of the Mediterranean route. In accordance with these plans, the main task of the Royal 
Navy was the defence of the mother country that was followed by the security of the 
British possessions in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean against Japan. After 1922 Japan 
behaved in a hostile way towards England that is why the British drew up the plans of the 
Singapore naval base.10 Singapore became the corner stone in the defence policy of the 
British Empire soon, however, the base itself was not ready until 1938. The most 
important role of the Royal Navy was to relief "the Gibraltar of the Far East" against a 
possible Japanese attack. The second largest British fleet was stationed in the 
9 Command Papers 4817. Fleets, the British Commonwealth of Nations and Foreign Countries, 
February 1935. London, H. M. S. O., 1935. 
10 More information about the question of Singapore: Command Papers 2083, The Singapore Base. 
Correspondence with the Dominions and India. London, H. M. S. O, 1924.; Woodburn Kirby, S: 
Singapore, the Chain of Disaster. London, Macmillan, 1971. Grenfell, Russell: Main Fleet to 
Singapore. Oxford, Faber, 1951.; Neidpath, James: The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of 
Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981.; Mclntyre, W. D.: The Rise 
and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base, 1919-1942. London, Macmillan, 1979.; Higham, Robin: 
Armed Forces in Peacetime Britain, 1918-1939. London, Foulis, 1962.; Lowe, Peter: Britain in the 
Far East. London, Longman, 1981.; Kennedy, Malcolm D.: The Estrangement of Great Britain and 
Japan, 1917-1935. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.; Louis, Roger: British Strategy in 
the Far East, 1919-1939. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. 
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Mediterranean, because this fleet was considered suitable to fight in the Eastern Asian 
waters. On the other hands, these warships had to defend the sea route crossing the Suez 
Canal to Singapore. Naval units stationed in Malta had a main role because in case of 
emergency, they could be quickly redeployed either to the Home Fleet or the Far East. 
With regard to these plans the Royal Navy needed 28 days to reach Singapore from 
England via Suez. In case of closing the Mediterranean, the British warships needed more 
than 45 days to get their Far Eastern base.11 With regard to the relief of Singapore it was 
very important to make this shorter Mediterranean route between England and East Asia 
absolutely secure. 
The Italo-Ethiopian War 
Far Eastern plans of the Admiralty took a friendly Italy into account and assumed that 
in case of war against Japan, Britain could abandon the Mediterranean without difficulties. 
During the Italo-Abyssinian crisis the previous good relations between London and Rome 
were deteriorated. The British Government decided to stand by the ideas of Leauge of 
Nations and did not leave Ethiopia without international support. The Admiralty ordered 
the Mediterranean Fleet to leave the anchorage of Malta in September 1935 and the 
warships headed for the Levantine waters that were more protected from the Italian 
airplanes. Only Alexandria was capable of accommodating this size of fleet, so the Royal 
Navy was stationed here for almost a year. In 1935-1936, owing to the Ethiopian crisis, 
Alexandria became the main reservoir of the British naval forces. Warships arrived there 
to strengthen the Mediterranean Fleet from all over the world. By October 1935 the 
Admiralty ordered 8 battleships and battlecruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers, 50 
destroyers and 17 submarines in the Mediterranean waters.12 The units of this great 
Armada had not enough place in Alexandria that is why more warships were stationed 
permanently at Gibraltar, Haifa and Port Said.13 
The Admiralty carried out the orders of the government, though at the same time it 
could not understand the enthusiasm of the British politicians towards the ideas of the 
Leauge of Nations. The admirals were thinking globally and rationally that is why they 
did not want to break with the. traditional Italian friendship. England had not real interests 
in the landlocked Ethiopia. In the African country there were not important British 
investments, the often mentioned Lake Tana was not worth a war.14 It was indifferent to 
the British defence strategy whether Abyssinia was occupied by the Italians or not. The 
Admiralty did not want to sacrifice its warships and seamen, because they were needed 
against the more dangerous Germany and Japan. The defence of the British interests in the 
" Marder, Arthur J.: Old Friends, New Enemies. The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. 
Volume I: Strategic Elusions, 1936-1941. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. pp. 36-37. 
12 Edwards 1938: op.cit., pp. 145-158. 
13 Pack: op.cit., pp. 133-134. 
14 About the British interests in Ethiopia: János Melocco: Mi van és mi lehet Abesszíniában? ( What 
is and what can be in Abyssinia?) Budapest, kiadó nélkül, 1935. pp. 10-11. 
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Far East and the North Sea deverted the admirals from the support of a war in the 
Mediterranean. 
The strained relationship between England and Italy did not ease in the winter of 
1935-1936. In March 1936 there was a significant change in the international relations. 
Hitler occupied the demilitarized Rh in elan d that is why an Anglo-German war seemed 
imminent. Leaders of the Admiralty were frightened since the bulk of the Royal Navy was 
concentrated in the Mediterranean while the North Sea remained unprotected in case of a 
German naval attack. The chiefs of the naval staff urged the abandonment of the fleet 
demonstration against Italy to relieve the warships for duty in the home waters.15 
By May 1936 Mussolini conquered Ethiopia. Great Britain demonstrated her powerful 
fleet in vain, she could not divert the Italian dictator from the agression. In July 1936 the 
Mediterranean Fleet left Alexandria and returned to his peacetime station, Malta. During 
the crisis, Britain could keep neither the Ethiopian independence nor the friendship of 
Italy. The Abyssinian conflict threw light on the military weakness of Great Britain in the 
Mediterranean. The British admirals knew that the state of the Royal Navy in 1935 would 
not have allowed them to fight a war with heavy losses. The Royal Navy, limited by the 
Washington and London naval treaties, was not able to cope with simultaneous challenges 
in differrent parts of the world. The Rhineland crisis proved that the English navy was not 
capable of lining up appropriate forces in the Mediterranean and the North Sea at the same 
time. In the first half of 1936 the fleet was concentrated in the Levantine waters, so there 
were not enough warships to defend the British interests neither against Germany nor 
Japan. 
The appreciation of the Mediterranean 
While as the result of the Ethiopian crisis the English geopolitical situation was 
steadily deteriorated, her position became better in the Middle East. Being frightened of 
the Italian expansion, Egypt was ready to give up the hostile attitude towards London, 
which was followed by the Treaty of Alliance between England and Egypt on 26 August 
1936.16 This agreement secured the military control of Egypt and the Suez Canal for Great 
Britain. The harbour in Alexandria was very important, because it was the only naval base 
relatively far from' the Italian air bases. The agreement contained the free use of 
Alexandria until 1944. During the international crises after 1936, the British 
Mediterranean Fleet was redeployed several times from Malta to the Egyptian city. 
Owing to the Italian expansion, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania appealed to 
England for military help. With regard to the British defence strategy, especially the 
security of Greece and Turkey had a great importance.17 After the Montreux Conference 
in 1936, Ankara became the sole protector of the straits, so an appropriate support to 
15 Gibbs, N. H.: Grand Strategy. Volume I, Rearmament Policy. London, Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1976. p. 249. 
16 Command Papers 5360. Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United 
Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt. London, August 26, 1936. London, H. M. S. O., 1936. 
17 Gibbs: op.cit., pp. 209-222. 
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Turkey was absolutely essential. Turkey got a major role in case of a war against Italy. 
The oil supplies of Italy depended on shipments from the Black Sea, closing of the straits 
would have easily stopped Mussolini's African war. In the 1930s, except of the three great 
powers, Turkey had the greatest military potential in the Mediterranean. It is also 
important to mention the role of the Soviet Union since England could neutralize the 
Mediterranean efforts of Moscow by the help of the Turks relatively easily. 
Before the end of the Italo-Ethiopian war, there was an uprising among the Arabs in 
Palestine, which mandate territory was very important in the defence of the Suez Canal. 
The Arab-Jewish conflict endangered the security of the pipeline coming from Iraq to 
Haifa, so it could cause trouble in the fuel supply of the British Fleet. The Arab uprising 
did not finish until 1939, when the British strictly limited the number of Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine. In summer 1936 a civil war broke out in the western basin of the 
Mediterranean in Spain. Mussolini's intervention frightened the English admirals, they 
worried about the safety of Gibraltar.They were also anxious because of the rumours 
according to which Rome wanted to occupy the Balearic and Canary Isles. The trouble in 
Palestine and the Spanish civil war made the Mediterranean Fleet partly mobilized for two 
and a half years. The British warships had primarily humanitarian duties on the Iberian 
coasts, and they tried to protect the British merchant shipping against air and naval attacks 
of the fighting opponents. 
The Anglo-Italian relations became worse in spite of the exchange of notes in 1937 
and the agreements of 1938,18 and a war seemed inevitable between the two countries. In 
these circumstances the naval strategy based on the relief of Singapore, which was worked 
out in the early 1920s seemed to be unrealizable. Against this fact, the Admiralty was 
reluctant to give up the plan sending the main fleet to the East. The admirals felt the 
increased tension in the Mediterranean, so they decided to extend the period before of 
relief to 70 days, which was necessary for dislocating the fleet to the Far Eastern waters. 
In the first four months of 1939 Germany and Italy made aggressive steps that 
basically changed the Admiralty's naval strategy. In April 1939 the Italians occupied 
Albania and after this event the British gave guarantees to the endangered Balkan states. 
These guarantees made the fulfilment of the original war plan of the Admiralty 
impossible. 
The discussions between the English and French general staffs had a major role in the 
change of the priority order in the imperial defence. France was against the military 
obligations of the British in the Far East. First they planned to defeat Italy and after the 
victory in the Mediterranean, they wanted to settle up Japan. The English and French 
admirals agreed that the eastern basin of the Mediterranean would become a British 
sphere of responsibility and the defence of the western basin would belong to the French. 
By summer 1939 the English accepted the priority of the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, so they renounced the Far East. The period before relief of Singapore extended first 
90, later 180 days, therefore the eastern colonies and dominions of the Empire were left 
alone against a possible Japanese attack.19 
18 Halmosy: op.cit., pp. 412-414 and 427^36. 
19 Grenfell: op.cit., ρ 70. 
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In 1939 the Admiralty gave up an almost twenty years old conception and marked the 
Mediterranean as the most important area after the home waters. The British admirals 
hoped to knock out the weak Italian fleet in a blitzkrieg then send the relieved warships to 
the Far East. An immediate defeat of Italy became impossible because of the French 
collapse in 1940 and the German military support to Rome. Therefore in the first years of 
the Second World War the main battlefield of the British Empire became the area of the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Between 1940 and 1943 the Royal Navy suffered 
heavy losses to reopen the route across the Mediterranean. Ironically, when in 1945 the 
main fleet was sent to the East Asian waters through the Suez Canal, the war against 
Japan was actually over. 
